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Abstract
This paper examines the time varying impact of technology news shocks on
the U.S. economy during the Post-World War II era using a structural time varying
parameter vector autoregressive (TVP-VAR) model. The identification restrictions
are derived from a standard new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model and hold for a wide range of parameter constellations. In addition,
the set of restrictions is sufficient to discriminate technology news shocks from
other supply and demand side disturbances - technology surprise shocks among
them. Overall, there is little evidence that the variance of technology news shocks
or their transmission to real activity and inflation has changed over time. However,
I detect significant time variation in the endogenous monetary policy reaction to
technology news shocks; responding strongly to inflation most of the time, but
less during the Great Inflation period. The evidence of this paper thus supports the
hypothesis that the high inflation rates of the mid and late 1970s were the result of
bad policy rather than bad luck.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing literature on news about future changes in aggregate technology - technology
news shocks - and their role in explaining business cycle fluctuations. Technology news shocks
do not affect aggregate technology contemporaneously - as technology surprise shocks do - but are
incorporated into the decision making of forward-looking households and firms. Good news
about future aggregate technology increases expected income, so households expand their con-
sumption today. Moreover, firms face lower expectedmarginal costs and thus cut their prices. In
recent theoretical papers, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2008), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) as well
as Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) introduce technology news shocks into standard
business cycle models and argue that these are a potentially important source for aggregate
fluctuations. Empirical contributions using vector autoregressions include Beaudry and Portier
(2006), who find that future changes in aggregate technology are instantaneously reflected by
today’s stock returns. Furthermore, Fratzscher and Straub (2010) demonstrate the importance
of technology news shocks in explaining current account fluctuations, while Barsky and Sims
(2011) reassess the relevance of news driven business cycles.
In this paper I examine the time varying impact of technology news shocks on the U.S. econ-
omy during the Post-World War II era using a structural time varying parameter VAR model.
Given that there is considerable evidence that the structure of the U.S. economy has changed
over the last decades, it is surprising that the empirical literature on technology news shocks has
not yet explored whether the size and transmission of such shocks has been stable over time or
not. The contribution of this paper is thus novel in this respect.
The TVP-VARmodel is developed inter alia in Cogley and Sargent (2001) as well as Primiceri
(2005) and features both time varying coefficients and stochastic volatility. The model is hence
an appropriate framework to address the question of interest since it allows for smooth and per-
manent changes in the structure of the economy via drifting coefficients, while accounting for
the possibility that the size of the shocks is not stable over time. For instance Galí and Gambetti
(2009) employ this model to study whether the remarkable decline in the volatility of real ac-
tivity and inflation since the mid 1980s, known as the Great Moderation, was the result of a drop
in the magnitude of technology and non-technology shocks. At least in part, they reject this
good luck hypothesis. Hofmann, Peersman, and Straub (2010) use a structural TVP-VAR model
to explore the time variation in the effects of technology surprise shocks on the U.S. economy.
Their findings suggest that the high inflation rates of the mid and late 1970s can be linked to
a high degree of wage indexation in combination with a weak reaction of the monetary policy
authority to inflation. Hofmann et al. (2010) hence provide a richer explanation for the under-
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lying sources of the Great Inflation than the well-known bad luck story, which suggests that the
poor economic performance of the mid and late 1970s was primarily due to exceptionally large
unfavorable economic shocks.
The approach of this paper is structural in the sense that I work with model-based restric-
tions in identification. The restrictions are derived from a standard newKeynesian DSGEmodel
and robust to parameter uncertainty. Furthermore, the set of restrictions is sufficient to dis-
criminate technology news shocks from other supply and demand side disturbances, namely
technology surprise, monetary policy, preference, and labor supply shocks, respectively. Such
a model-based identification strategy is preferable to more conventional short and long-run
identification schemes since it neither requires to add an estimate for unobserved technology
to the model nor relies on contemporaneous zero restrictions that are often inconsistent with
economic theory. Moreover, the methodology used allows me to link the reduced form evidence
coming from the empirical model to the theoretical business cycle model and hence to provide
a possible structural explanation for the observed time variation.
Overall, there is little evidence that the variance of technology news shocks or their trans-
mission to real activity and inflation has changed over time. In particular, the findings do not
support the hypothesis that such shocks have contributed significantly to the Great Modera-
tion. However, I detect significant time variation in the endogenous monetary policy reaction to
technology news shocks; responding strongly to inflation most of the time, but less during the
Great Inflation period. Using the theoretical business cycle model, I argue that the observed time
variation in the nominal interest rate may be explained by a systematic change in the relative
size of the coefficients in the monetary policy rule before and after the Great Inflation period.
The evidence of this paper thus supports the hypothesis that the high inflation rates of the mid
and late 1970s were the result of bad policy rather than bad luck as suggested for instance by
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), Cogley and Sargent (2001), or Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the business cycle
model and derives robust theoretical restrictions in order to achieve identification in the empir-
ical model. Section 3 presents the structural TVP-VAR model that is used to explore the time
varying transmission of technology news shocks to the U.S. economy. Section 4 documents
the time varying impact of technology news shocks on the U.S. economy for the period 1962:4
to 2010:3. The reduced form evidence includes the time profiles for impulse responses and the
volatility in macroeconomic series that results from these shocks. Section 5 provides a possible
structural explanation for the reported time variation. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
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2 Technology news in a business cycle model
This section outlines the business cyclemodel and derives robust theoretical restrictions in order
to achieve identification in the empirical model. The business cycle model is a closed economy
new Keynesian DSGE model,1 featuring optimizing households and firms, an interest rate set-
ting monetary policy authority, monopolistic competition in the goods market, nominal as well
as real rigidities, and five structural shocks, a technology news shock among them. The nomi-
nal and real imperfections are included to account for the empirical evidence of staggered price
setting, labor market imperfections, and monetary policy non-neutrality. The structural shocks
are considered to discriminate technology news from other important supply and demand side
disturbances - technology surprise, labor supply, monetary policy, and preference shocks, re-
spectively.
2.1 The model
2.1.1 Households
The model economy is inhabited by a representative infinitely-lived household, seeking to max-
imize its lifetime utility by choosing purchases of a consumption bundle Ct and one-period
bonds Bt, and the labor supply Nt
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βtebt
(
C1−σt
1− σ
− ent
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
)
, (1)
where β is the discount factor, σ denotes the degree of relative risk aversion and ϕ is the in-
verse of the labor supply elasticity with respect to the real wage. The household’s consump-
tion/savings and labor supply decisions are affected by a preference shock, ebt , which alters the
intertemporal substitution of the household and a shock to the labor supply, ent . Both shocks are
assumed to follow stationary first-order autoregressive processes with i.i.d. innovation terms:
ln ebt = ρb ln e
b
t−1 + ν
b
t and ln e
n
t = ρn ln e
n
t−1 + ν
n
t , where ln · denotes the natural logarithm.
The maximization of lifetime utility is subject to a sequence of period budget constraints of
the following form
PtCt +QtBt ≤ Bt−1 +WtNt +Dt. (2)
1The model is the standard workhorse in the literature of business cycle analysis. In this paper I use a
modified and extended version of the baseline model described in Chapter 3 of Galí (2008).
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Pt denotes the aggregate price level,Qt is the price of a one-period bond,Wt is the nominal wage
and Dt is a dividend income from the ownership of firms. The optimal consumption/savings
and labor supply plans are characterized by two conditions of the form
Wt
Pt
= entN
ϕ
t C
σ
t =MRSt, (3)
1 = βRtEt
[
ebt+1
ebt
C−σt+1
C−σt
Pt
Pt+1
]
, (4)
where the latter is a conventional stochastic Euler equation. MRSt denotes the marginal rate of
substitution and Rt = 1/Qt is the riskless return on a one-period bond paying off one unit of
currency in period t+ 1.
In addition to the consumption/savings and labor supply decisions, the household has to
decide on the optimal composition of the consumption bundle. Assume the existence of a con-
tinuum of goods indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. The consumption bundle is given by
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
Ct (i)
1− 1
 di
] 
−1
, for  > 1, (5)
with Ct (i) representing the quantity of good i consumed by the household in period t. Maxi-
mizing the consumption bundle for any given level of expenditures
∫ 1
0 Pt (i)Ct (i) di, yields the
following set of demand equations
Ct (i) =
[
Pt (i)
Pt
]−
Ct, for all i, (6)
where Pt =
[∫ 1
0 Pt (i)
1− di
] 1
1−
denotes the aggregate price level, Pt (i) is the price of good i in
period t and  represents the elasticity of good i with respect to its own price.
2.1.2 Firms and price setting
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each firm
produces a differentiated good using a production function of the form
Yt (i) = AtNt (i)
1−α . (7)
At is an aggregate technology shock, assumed to be common to all firms and 1−α is the steady
state labor share of output. Taking the nominal wage Wt and the aggregate price level Pt as
given, minimizing total production costs Wt
Pt
Nt (i) with respect to labor input Nt (i) and subject
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to the production technology given by Equation (7), yields the following expression for a firm’s
real marginal costs
MCt (i) =
WtNt (i)
α
(1− α)AtPt
. (8)
As in Calvo (1983), firms are not allowed to reset their prices unless they receive a random
signal. The probability that a given price can be reoptimized in any particular period is 1 − θ,
independent of the time elapsed since the last adjustment. A firm j reoptimizing in period t
chooses the price P ∗t (j) that maximizes the discounted sum of expected nominal profits
max Et
∞∑
k=0
θkQt+k [P
∗
t (j)Yt+k (j)− Pt+kMCt+k (j)Yt+k (j)] , (9)
subject to the sequence of demand functions
Yt+k (j) =
[
P ∗t (j)
Pt+k
]−
Ct+k, for all k, (10)
where Qt+k = β
k
(
ebt+k/e
b
t
)
(Ct+k/Ct)
−σ (Pt/Pt+k) is the stochastic dicount factor of the house-
hold owing the firm. The resulting first order condition is
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkQt+kYt+k [P
∗
t (j)− (1 + λp)Pt+kMCt+k (j)] = 0, (11)
with 1 + λp = / (− 1) denoting the price markup over nominal marginal costs. Under com-
pletely flexible prices (θ = 0) and perfectly competitive goods markets (λp = 0), the condition
reduces to the familiar P ∗t (j) = PtMCt (j).
Since the price setting problem is identical to all firms, each firm i chooses the same price
P ∗t (i) = P
∗
t when reoptimizing. Hence, the aggregate price level evolves according to the
following expression
P 1−t = θP
1−
t−1 + (1− θ) (P
∗
t )
1− . (12)
2.1.3 Monetary policy
The monetary policy authority is assumed to have control over the riskless return, i.e., the nom-
inal short-term interest rate in the economy. In particular, I assume that the interest rate Rt
evolves according to the following Taylor-type interest rate rule
Rt
Rsst
=
(
Pt
Pt−1
)φpi ( Yt
Y ft
)φy
ert , (13)
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where Rsst is the steady state interest rate, Y
f
t is the output that would prevail if prices were
perfectly flexible, and φpi and φy represent the elasticity of the interest rate to the quarterly gross
inflation rate (Πt = Pt/Pt−1) and the output gap (Yt/Y
f
t ), respectively. Moreover, deviations
from the rule are captured by a monetary policy shock, ert , which follows a stationary first-order
autoregressive process with i.i.d. innovation term: ln ert = ρr ln e
r
t−1+ν
r
t . Once linearized, such
a rule is a plausible description of the Fed’s policy over the last decades.2
2.1.4 Market clearing and real wage rigidities
The model abstracts from capital accumulation, government purchases and net exports. Hence,
market clearing in the goods market requires
Yt = Ct, for all t, (14)
meaning that aggregate output equals aggregate consumption in equlibrium. Furthermore, the
labor market is in equilibrium if the firms’ demand for labor equals the labor supply by house-
holds at the wage level set by unions.
Similar to Blanchard and Galí (2007, 2009), I introduce real wage rigidities into the model by
modifying the household’s optimality condition in Equation (3) to
Wt
Pt
= [(1 + λw)MRSt]
1−γ , (15)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of real wage rigidities in the labor market and λw ≥ 0
is a steady state wage markup, chosen to be as large as necessary to prevent the real wage
from falling below the marginal rate of substitution at any point in time. Though not explicitly
derived from a model of the labor market, Equation (15) is a parsimonious way to capture the
notion that labor markets are not perfectly competitive and real wages may adjust only slowly
to labor market conditions.3
2.1.5 Technology process
In order to explore the response of the model economy to both anticipated and unanticipated
changes in aggregate technology, an appropriate process for At needs to be specified. Particu-
2See for instance Taylor (1993).
3The main reason for including labor market imperfections into business cycle models is that more
rigid wages translate into more persistent movements of aggregate inflation - a feature often found in the
data. See for instance Christoffel, Kuester, and Linzert (2009) or Christoffel and Linzert (2010).
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larly, I assume that the technology shock follows a stationary first-order autoregressive process
with i.i.d innovation term
ln At = ρa ln At−1 + ln Gt−1 + ν
a
t , (16)
with Gt itself evolving according to a stationary first-order autoregressive process: ln Gt =
ρg ln Gt−1+ ν
g
t . To see the implication of this timing assumption, plug the latter expression into
Equation (16) and obtain the following process determining the evolution of technology4
ln At = ρa ln At−1 + ρg ln Gt−2 + ν
a
t + ν
g
t−1. (17)
Period t changes in aggregate technology are hence the result of either unanticipated innova-
tions, i.e., technology surprise shocks νat , or due to innovations that are anticipated by economic
agents one period in advance, i.e., technology news shocks νgt−1.
In an empirical application, however, two difficulties arise. First, technology is not observ-
able. And second, even if data or an estimate for At would be available, in a univariate context
it is not possible to discriminate between technology surprise and news shocks. To overcome
these difficulties, I move beyond univariate time series models and run a vector autoregression
on observable variables, not including unobserved or estimated technology. Moreover, I dis-
criminate between technology surprise and news shocks by imposing theoretical restrictions on
the short-run response of observable variables. The derivation of these restrictions is outlined
in the next section.
2.2 Deriving the sign restrictions
2.2.1 Baseline calibration
In the baseline calibration of the model,5 I assume that the discount factor β = 0.99, implying
an annual steady state real interest rate of 4%. The Calvo parameter θ determining the degree of
nominal rigidites in the goods market is set to 0.75, which implies an average price duration of
one year. Following Blanchard and Galí (2009), I target a moderate degree of real wage rigidi-
ties (γ = 0.75) and abstract from any wage markup (λw = 0). The latter assumption does not
affect the implications of the model since a positive but constant steady state markup would
disappear anyway once the model is simulated in deviations from steady state. Furthermore,
4See Barsky and Sims (2011) for a similar approach.
5The business cycle model is log-linearized before simulating it. See Appendix A for the linearized
equilibrium of the model.
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I set the production function parameter α = 0.33, consistent with a steady state labor income
share of about two third. I also assume that the parameter reflecting the degree of monopolistic
competition in the goods market  = 6, equivalent to a price markup over marginal costs of 20%
(i.e., λp = 0.2). With respect to the household’s preference parameters, I use the following com-
bination. The parameter determining the degree of relative risk aversion σ is set to 3, while the
parameter driving the labor supply utility ϕ is calibrated to 1.5. This parameter choice is equiv-
alent to an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 1/3 and a Frisch elasticity of work effort
with respect to the real wage of 2/3. For the parameters of the monetary policy rule, I assume
φpi = 1.5 and φy = 0.5. Such a parameterization appears to be a plausible description of the
Fed’s average policy over the last decades. Moreover, a φpi > 1 ensures the determinacy of the
model since the monetary policy authority responds to movements in inflation more than just
one to one, thus satisfying the Taylor Principle. The autoregressive coefficients for the technology
surprise, the preference and the labor supply shock are set to ρa = ρb = ρn = 0.9, which implies
a relatively high degree of persistence for these shocks. Since the persistence of the technology
news shock depends on both ρa and ρg, I use a smaller value for ρg compared to ρa in order to
avoid that the technology news shock becomes too persistent. I set ρg = 0.75. Similarly, I set
ρr = 0.75, consistent with the notion that monetary policy shocks are less persistent than real
disturbances. Overall, the parameter constellation used is consistent with a large part of the
new Keynesian literature6 and matches a quarterly model.
Figures 1 and 2 report the results for the technology surprise and news shock, respectively.
I show the model implied impulse responses for output (or consumption), inflation, nominal
and real interest rates, hours worked, and real wages up to a horizon of 40 quarters after a
shock. Both shocks are equal in size (unit innovation) and normalized on a positive output
response. Consistent with a large part of the new Keynesian literature, a positive technology
surprise shock increases output and real wages, but decreases inflation, nominal as well as real
interest rates, and hours worked. Similarly, a positive technology news shock raises output and
real wages, while it has a negative impact on inflation. But contrary to the technology surprise
shock, the news shock induces a hump-shaped response for output (or consumption) with the
maximal effect postponed by several quarters. Given that the increase in income, which comes
along with the future technology improvement, is anticipated by foreward-looking households,
the postponement of production/consumption may only be explained by a substantial rise in
the real interest rate. In fact, the real interest rate displays a positive response to the technology
news shock for a few quarters, which separates the technology news from the surprise shock.
6See for instance the handbook article by Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2011) for an overview.
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Moreover, the technology news shock is associated with a positive response for hours worked
and an increase in the nominal interest rate. The latter finding comes from the fact that the
technology news shock has a delayed impact on flexible price output and hence leads to a large
positive output gap on impact. Given a sufficiently strong reaction of the monetary policy
authority to the output gap, the nominal interest rate increases despite the negative response
for inflation.
The theoretical impulse responses to the non-technology shocks are shown in Figures 3 to
5. Following a negative monetary policy shock, interest rates, both in nominal and real terms,
decline, and output, inflation, hours worked as well as real wages increase. It is this positive
correlation between output and inflation that disentangles a monetary policy shock from both
technology shocks. The same reasoning applies to the preference shock. In the business cycle
model, a preference shock is a standard aggregate demand shock that induces a positive co-
movement of output, inflation, nominal and real interest rates, hours worked, and real wages.
Moreover, the positive correlation between output and inflation on the one hand and real inter-
est rates on the other hand allows me to distinguish preference and monetary policy shocks.
Finally, a negative shock to the labor supply leads to an increase in output and hours
worked, but decreases the real wage. The response of the latter discriminates a labor supply
from a technology surprise shock. Furthermore, a labor supply shock is different from a tech-
nology news shock since it is followed by a negative real interest rate response. In addition, the
negative correlation between output and inflation conditional on a labor supply shock separates
it from a monetary policy and preference shock.
2.2.2 Simulation exercise
In order to explore the sensitivity of these results with respect to the calibration of the model,
I conduct a simulation exercise and exhaust the parameter space by allowing all the structural
parameters to vary simultaneously. In particular, I assume that all parameters are uniformly
and independently distributed on the intervals reported in Table 1, with prior means equal or
close to the values used in the baseline calibration. For the discount factor β, I set the interval
to [0.985, 0.995], implying an annual steady state real interest rate between 2% and 6%. More-
over, I restrict the range for both the Calvo parameter θ and the labor market parameter γ to
[0.5, 0.95]. The interval for the production function parameter α is set to [0, 0.66], which implies
a mean steady state labor income share of about two third. I also assume that  ∈ [3, 9], meaning
that the price markup roughly varies between 10% and 50%. The preference parameters σ and
ϕ are restricted to the intervals [1, 5] and [0, 3], respectively. Moreover, the parameters of the
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Table 1: Parameter ranges and values
Parameter/ description Simulation Baseline
β Discount factor [0.985, 0.995] 0.99
θ Degree of nominal rigidities in the goods market [0.50, 0.95] 0.75
γ Degree of real rigidities in the labor market [0.50, 0.95] 0.75
α Production function parameter [0.00, 0.66] 0.33
 Degree of monopolistic competition in the goods market [3.00, 9.00] 6.00
σ Degree of relative risk aversion [1.00, 5.00] 3.00
ϕ Inverse of labor supply elasticity [0.00, 3.00] 1.50
φpi Monetary policy response to inflation [1.01, 2.00] 1.50
φy Monetary policy response to output gap [0.00, 1.00] 0.50
ρa Persistence of technology surprise shocks [0.75, 0.99] 0.90
ρg Persistence of technology news shocks [0.33, 0.85] 0.75
ρr Persistence of monetary policy shocks [0.33, 0.85] 0.75
ρb Persistence of preference shocks [0.75, 0.99] 0.90
ρn Persistence of labor supply shocks [0.75, 0.99] 0.90
monetary policy rule are within the ranges typically considered in the literature: φpi ∈ [1.01, 2]
and φy ∈ [0, 1]. And consistent with the baseline calibration, I target a relatively high degree of
persistence for the technology surprise, preference and labor supply shocks and set the corre-
sponding intervals to [0.75, 0.99], while I assume that both ρg and ρr lie within [0.33, 0.85], hence
being less persistent on average.
To obtain a posterior distribution, I repeatedly draw a set of model parameters from these
predefined intervals, calculate the associated impulse responses and save them. In total, I per-
form 10,000 repetitions. The results for this simulation exercise are reported in Figures 6 to 10.
Each figure shows the pointwise difference between the 84th and 16th percentiles7 of the pos-
terior distribution (gray shaded area), hence providing some intuition on the sensitivity of the
theoretical impulse responses to the choice of the parameter constellation.
Altogether, the simulation outcome suggests that the results of the previous section are ro-
bust to alternative calibrations of the model. With only two exceptions, all impulse responses
show the same sign in the short-run compared to the baseline calibration. It turns out that the
response for hours worked to a technology surprise shock is particularly sensitive to the pa-
rameter choice, which is consistent with the conflicting evidence of the real business cycle and
new Keynesian literature in this respect. Moreover, the nominal interest rate may rise or fall
7This means that parameter constellations that lead to extreme responses in the tails are ruled out.
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Table 2: Theoretical impulse responses
Shock/ variable Output Inflation Real interest rate Real wages
Technology surprise ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
Technology news ↑ ↓ ↑
Monetary policy ↑ ↑ ↓
Preference ↑ ↑ ↑
Labor supply ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓
in response to technology news shocks, depending on the calibration of the model. Given that
I need neither the nominal interest rate nor the hours worked to disentangle technology news
from other shocks, these findings do not have any consequences for the identification of the
empirical model.
Table 2 summarizes the implications derived from the theoretical business cycle model. ↑
indicates that the model suggests a positive short-run response for a particular variable to a
shock, while ↓ means a negative response. The corresponding entry is left blank if either the
theoretical model does not deliver a clear prediction or the restriction is not needed to achieve
identification in the empirial model. Hence, this set of restrictions is robust across a wide range
of different parameter combinations, while it at the same time respresents theminimumnumber
of restrictions that is needed to discriminate the five shocks.
3 The empirical model
This section presents the structural TVP-VAR model that is used to explore the time varying
transmission of technology news shocks to the U.S. economy. The model allows for both time
variation in the coefficients and stochastic volatility. With respect to the model specificaton,
the calibration of the priors, and the Bayesian estimation procedure, I follow Primiceri (2005).
Moreover, I identify technology news shocks per sign restrictions on impulse responses using
the theoretical restrictions derived in Section 2.2.
3.1 Bayesian VAR with time varying parameters
Consider the TVP-VAR model
yt = ct +B1,tyt−1 + ...+Bp,tyt−p + ut = X
′
tBt + ut. (18)
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yt is a 5× 1 vector of endogenous variables including output growth, inflation, a nominal short-
term interest rate, the growth in hours worked, and the growth in real wages in that order; ct
is a 5 × 1 vector of time varying intercepts; Bi,t are 5 × 5 matrices of time varying coefficients;
i = 1, ..., p denotes the lags included; ut is a 5 × 1 vector of residual terms with zero mean
and time varying covariance matrix Ωt; and data are available for t = 1, ..., T . Let X
′
t = I5 ⊗[
1, y′t−1, ..., y
′
t−p
]
and Bt = vec
(
[ct, B1,t, ..., Bp,t]
′), where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product and
vec (·) is the column stacking operator, respectively.
The covariance matrix Ωt can be decomposed as follows
8
AtΩtA
′
t = ΣtΣ
′
t, (19)
where At is a lower triangular matrix which models the contemporaneous interactions among
the variables
At =


1 0 0 0 0
α21,t 1 0 0 0
α31,t α32,t 1 0 0
α41,t α42,t α43,t 1 0
α51,t α52,t α53,t α54,t 1


,
and Σt is a diagonal matrix which contains the stochastic volatilities
Σt =


σ1,t 0 0 0 0
0 σ2,t 0 0 0
0 0 σ3,t 0 0
0 0 0 σ4,t 0
0 0 0 0 σ5,t


.
Let α be the vector of non-zero and non-one elements of At (stacked by rows), σt be the
vector of the diagonal elements of Σt and Bt be the vector containing all the coefficients of the
TVP-VAR. The time varying parameters are assumed to evolve as follows
Bt = Bt−1 + νt, νt ∼ N (0, Q) , (20)
αt = αt−1 + ξt, ξt ∼ N (0, S) , (21)
ln σt = ln σt−1 + ηt, ηt ∼ N (0,W ) , (22)
8This decomposition ensures that the covariance matrix is positive definite.
13
where the innovation terms have zero mean, are normally distributed and independent of each
other. The elements ofBt andAt are thusmodelled as driftless randomwalks, while the stochas-
tic volatilities in σt follow a geometric random walk. The random walk assumption reduces the
number of parameters significantly and hence allows for an efficient estimation of the model.
To ensure stationarity, I follow Cogley and Sargent (2001) and discard all draws for the coeffi-
cient vector that lead to an explosive solution of the TVP-VAR. In particular, I check for each
draw whether the roots of the associated TVP-VAR polynomial are outside the unit circle and
attribute zero prior weight to it if they are not.
Finally, it is also assumed that S has a block-diagonal structure of the following form:
S = Var (ξt) =


S1 01×2 01×3 01×4
02×1 S2 02×3 02×4
03×1 03×2 S3 03×4
04×1 04×2 04×3 S4

 ,
where S1 = Var (ξ21,t), S2 = Var
(
[ξ31,t, ξ32,t]
′), S3 = Var ([ξ41,t, ξ42,t, ξ43,t]′) and S4 =
Var
(
[ξ51,t, ξ52,t, ξ53,t, ξ54,t]
′) with Var (·) denoting the variance operator, implying that the co-
efficients evolve independently in each equation.
3.2 Specifications and data
I use quarterly U.S. data running from 1947:1 to 2010:3, obtained from the Federal Reserve
Economic Data (FRED) database.9 For output growth I include the (log) change in real GDP
(GDPC1), for inflation the (log) change in the GDP deflator (GDPDEF), for the nominal short-
term interest rate a 3-month Treasury bill rate (TB3MS), for growth in hours worked the (log)
change in total hours worked in the nonfarm business sector (HOANBS) and for growth in real
wages the (log) change in real compensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector (COM-
PRNBF). The mnemonics used by FRED are in parantheses.
Furthermore, I construct the impulse response for the real interest rate by taking the dif-
ference between the response for the nominal interest rate and the TVP-VAR model implied
one-quarter ahead forecast for inflation.10 Finally, I set the lag length to p = 2. Given that the
series included are stationary, such a parsimonious order should be sufficient to capture the
dynamics in the system, while it also keeps the estimation procedure tractable.
9See also Appendix B.
10For this reason I use a 3-month rate rather than the federal funds rate to measure monetary policy.
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3.3 Priors and estimation
The TVP-VAR model is estimated using Bayesian methods. In order to calibrate the prior dis-
tributions for the initial states, I run a constant parameter version of the model on a small train-
ing sample from 1947:2 to 1962:1 using ordinary least squares (OLS). The remaining data from
1962:2 to 2010:3 are used to estimate themodel. Following Primiceri (2005), I assume that the ini-
tial states for the coefficients (B0), the contemporaneous relations (A0), the stochastic volatilities
(σ0) and the hyperparamters (Q,S,W ) are independent of each other. Let xˆ denote the OLS point
estimate for a parameter x and Vˆxˆ the corresponding variance. For the coefficients and contem-
poraneous relations I specify normal priors p (·) of the following form: p (B0) = N
(
Bˆ, 4 · Vˆ
Bˆ
)
and p (A0) = N
(
Aˆ, 4 · Vˆ
Aˆ
)
, where the mean values of B0 and A0 are set to their OLS point
estimates, and the variances are chosen to be four times their variances in a constant parame-
ter version of the model. Moreover, I assume a log-normal prior for the stochastic volatilities:
p (ln σ0) = N (ln σˆ, I5). I set the mean value for σ0 to the corresponding OLS point estimate and
the variance to the identity matrix.11
Let IW (Ψ,m) denote the inverted Wishart distribution with scale matrix Ψ and m de-
grees of freedom. The priors for the hyperparameters Q and W are specified as follows:
p (Q) = IW
(
0.0001 · 60 · Vˆ
Bˆ
, 60
)
and p (W ) = IW (0.0001 · 6 · I5, 6), where the scale matri-
ces are constant fractions of the variances from a time invariant model (multiplied by the
degrees of freedom), while the degrees of freedom are set to the size of the training sample
(60 observations) and to one plus the dimension of the σ0 matrix (1 + dim (σ0) = 6), respec-
tively. Finally, I use the following priors for the blocks of S: p (S1) = IW
(
0.01 · 2 · Vˆ
Aˆ1
, 2
)
,
p (S2) = IW
(
0.01 · 3 · Vˆ
Aˆ2
, 3
)
, p (S3) = IW
(
0.01 · 4 · Vˆ
Aˆ3
, 4
)
and p (S4) = IW
(
0.01 · 5 · Vˆ
Aˆ4
, 5
)
,
where Aˆ1, Aˆ2, Aˆ3 and Aˆ4 are the corresponding blocks to S1, S2, S3 and S4 of Aˆ. The degrees of
freedom are set to one plus the number of corresponding entries in α0. Specified in this way, the
prior is diffuse and uninformative, and soon dominated by the information in the data.
To simulate the joint posterior distribution of (BT , AT ,ΣT , Q, S,W ), I use a Gibbs sampling
algorithm.12 The Gibbs sampler is a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method and is carried
out by sequentially drawing time varying coefficients (BT ), contemporaneous relations (AT ),
stochastic volatilities (ΣT ) and hyperparamters (Q,S,W ), given the data and the rest of the
parameters. The approach allows for an efficient estimation of the model since it treats all pa-
rameters as separate blocks in a Gibbs sampling algorithm and does not require to write down
11Flatter specifications of these priors produce similar results.
12The Gibbs sampling algorithm is outlined in Appendix C.
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a complicated likelihood for the model. The superscript (·)T indicates that the complete data
is used in estimation. The Gibbs sampler thus produces smoothed estimates of the parameters
using all the information availale in the data, as opposed to filtered estimates that exhaust only
the information contained in a particular subsample.
In total, I perform 20,000 iterations13 of the Gibbs sampler, discarding the first 15,000 to ab-
stract from the diffuse prior and only keep every 10th of the remaining 5,000 draws to break the
autocorrelation among them. Since the Gibbs sampler is a dependence chain algorithm, poste-
rior draws are not independent of each other. The remaining 500 draws are used for structural
analysis.
3.4 Identification
Consider the following structural representation of the TVP-VAR model in Equation (18):
yt = X
′
tBt + Ξtt, E
[
t
′
t
]
= I5, (23)
where Ξt maps the five structural shocks (t) into the residual terms (ut). If Ξt contains at least
5(5−1)
2 = 10 restrictions for any t = 1, ..., T , the system is just identified. A possible candidate for
Ξt is the lower triangular Cholesky factor of Ωt such that ΞtΞ
′
t = Ωt. Observe that, if there exists
a 5 × 5 orthonormal matrix H such that HH ′ = I5, ΞtH is also a possible decomposition, asso-
ciated with a different impulse matrix ΞtHt. This ability to create a large number of candidate
impulse matrices is the basis for the sign restriction approach.14
To obtain technology news shocks, I use the following algorithm. First, I estimate the TVP-
VAR as described in the previous section and sample 500 representative (non-explosive) states
of the economy for each point in time. Second, for each draw I construct 500 candidate im-
pulse matrices by randomly drawing orthonormal matrices using the multiple of the basic set of
Givens matrices.15 Third, I check for each cycle whether the candidate impulse matrix delivers
responses that have the following characteristics. The technology news shock increases output
and the real interest rate, but decreases inflation. These restrictions are imposed at horizons 0
13Further increasing the number of iterations delivers similar results.
14There exists an extensive literature on the working of the sign restriction approach. See for in-
stance Canova and De Nicoló (2002) or Uhlig (2005) for further details. Dedola and Neri (2007) as well as
Peersman and Straub (2009) are among the first who consider sign restrictions that are explicitly derived
from theoretical business cycle models.
15The construction of the rotation matrices is explained in Appendix D.
16
to 3 as ≥ 0 or ≤ 0, which is in line with the predictions of the business cycle model.16 I keep the
candidate draw if all the restrictions are satisfied, otherwise I discard it. This procedure leaves
me with roughly 6,000-14,000 responses for each point in time which I use for inference. Since
the focus of the empirical analysis is on technology news shocks, I do not attempt to identify
the other four shocks in the system.17
4 Time varying impact of technology news shocks
This section documents the time varying impact of technology news shocks on the U.S. economy
for the period 1962:4 to 2010:3. I report the time profiles for impulse responses and the volatility
in macroeconomic series that results from the shocks. The reduced form evidence provided in this
section is followed by Section 5 which outlines a possible structural explanation for the reported
time variation.
4.1 Time varying impulse responses
Figures 11 to 16 report the time varying impulse responses to technology news shocks for output
growth, inflation, the nominal interest rate, the real interest rate, the growth in hours worked,
and the growth in real wages, respectively. Each three-dimensional (3D) graph shows the pos-
terior mean18 at horizons 0 to 20 for the time period from 1962:4 to 2010:3. The x-axis plots the
horizon in quarters, the y-axis denotes the time period, and the z-axis shows the response in
percent or percentage points. Except for inflation and the nominal interest rate, I reverse the
ordering of the x-axis for better visibility.
As Figure 11 shows, there is little time variation in the response of output growth to tech-
nology news shocks. Output growth increases contemporaneously by about 1% on average and
16In fact, the restriction on the real interest rate is stronger than implied by the theoretical model. How-
ever, as Canova and Paustian (2010) show, for the sign restriction approach to work properly, a suffi-
ciently large number of restrictions is needed. The one-year horizon chosen for the sign restrictions seems
to be reasonable in this respect, while the link between the theoretical model and the empirical analysis
remains close. For the limitations of the sign restriction approach, see also Fry and Pagan (2010).
17The set of theoretical restrictions derived in the previous section could be used to identify technology
news, technology surprise, monetary policy, preference, and labor supply shocks simultaneously, and
hence to achieve a full identification of the TVP-VAR. However, I repeat the estimation and identification
procedure for each quarter between 1962:4 and 2010:3, i.e., 192 times, implying that achieving even partial
identification is cumbersome.
18The posterior mean is similar to the median but comes with smaller computational costs since it does
not require to save the complete posterior distribution for each response.
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declines thereafter. However, the impulse responses display a substantial degree of persistence;
it takes roughly 8-12 quarters for output growth to return to its pre-shock level. This in fact
implies a hump-shaped response for the level of output with the maximal effect postponed by
about 2-3 years, which is in line with the predictions of the business cycle model.19 Though the
persistence of the responses seems to be larger in some periods than in others, I do not obtain
any evidence in favor of a systematic change in the impact of technology news shocks on output
growth. The same conclusion can be drawn for the impact on inflation that is shown in Figure
12. There is no evidence that the shape of impulse responses varies systematically over time.
By construction, inflation is negative on impact and in the three following quarters. The initial
decline is estimated to be around 1.2% and shows little variation across time periods. Further-
more, the deflationary effect of technology news shocks goes well beyond the first year after the
shock. Across time periods inflation needs around 2-3 years to return to its pre-shock level, but
without showing a systematic change towards a more or less persistent behavior over time.
The picture is, however, different in case of the nominal interest rate for which the impulse
responses in Figure 13 exhibit substantial time variation. The first part of the sample, running
from the early 1960s to the early 1970s, is associated with an immediate - and in some years
strong - decline in the nominal interest rate. Around the mid 1970s though, the response for
the nominal interest rate switches its sign for several years, before again showing a negative
sign for most of the years from the mid 1980s onwards. Given that both the sign and magni-
tude of the initial responses for output growth and inflation are relatively stable over time, a
possible explanation for the observed time variation in the nominal interest rate is a change in
the systematic component of the monetary policy rule, responding strongly to inflation most of
the time but less during the high inflation period of the mid and late 1970s - the Great Inflation
era.20 As is shown in Section 2, the sign of the response for the nominal interest rate in the
business cycle model is not robust to parameter uncertainty, depending, among others, on the
calibration of the coefficients in the monetary policy rule. I return to this issue in the context of
the structural analysis in the next section. In addition, the real interest rate in Figure 14 displays
a similar response to the technology news shocks across time periods (around 2.5% on impact)
with the exception of the mid and late 1970s when the response is both stronger (up to 3.5%
19Remember that the identification restrictions are imposed on the level of output, i.e., the cumulated
impulse responses, not on growth rates, meaning that a negative response for output growth from hori-
zon 1 onwards is not a priori ruled out.
20In the business cycle model, the nominal interest rate adjusts to changes in inflation and the output
gap, not output growth. However, in the initial period after a technology news shock, output growth and
output gap coincide since flexible price output responds with a delay only.
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on impact) and more volatile, also supporting the view that a different monetary policy regime
was operating during that period.
Figures 15 and 16 plot the responses for the growth in hours worked and real wages, respec-
tively. Conditional on technology news shocks, the growth in hours worked increases on impact
by about 0.8% and declines in the quarters that follow. The shape of the impulse responses is
similar across periods and exhibits a substantial degree of persistence. The growth in hours
worked returns to its pre-shock level not before 8-12 quarters after a shock. The growth in real
wages, however, is less persistent; most of the adjustment - meaning the rise in real wages in
response to the expected increase in aggregate technology - takes place within a few quarters.
Such a rapid pass-through of technology news shocks to real wages is presumably the result of
an only moderate degree of labor market rigidities. Moreover, the contemporaneous response
of real wage growth is stable over time (about 1.5% on impact), thus providing no posterior
support for structural changes in the U.S. labor market during the Post-World War II period.
Given that the 3D graphs shown do not account for the uncertainty surrounding the impulse
responses, I provide additional evidence on the posterior uncertainty in Figures 17, which plots
the posterior mean responses for the initial quarter after the shock together with a 68 percent
confidence interval.21 With respect to output growth, inflation, the growth in hours worked and
real wages, Figure 17 underlines the previous findings. There is little time variation in the inital
responses of these variables to technology news shocks. Moreover, the width of the confidence
intervals is similar across time periods, not supporting the hypothesis that the size of the shocks
or their transmission to real activity and inflation has changed over time.
In contrast, the nominal interest rate shows significant variation across time periods. The
initial response is negative during the 1960s, switches its sign in the mid 1970s, and is again
negative for most time periods from the mid 1980s onwards. What is even more important, the
sign switch in the mid 1970s is significant in the sense that the complete posterior confidence
interval shifts upwards around that date. The endogenous monetary policy response to tech-
nology news shocks is hence a posteriori different during the mid and late 1970s compared to
the periods before and after. This conclusion also emerges from the initial response of the real
interest rate which is rather stable over time but exhibits several spikes during the 1970s and
early 1980s, both in the mean and bounds of the posterior confidence interval.
21The 68 percent confidence interval is calculated as the pointwise difference between the 84th and 16th
percentiles of the posterior distribution and corresponds to a one standard error band under normality.
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4.2 Evolution of the volatility
Before providing a possible structural explanation for the observed time variation in the mone-
tary policy response to technology news shocks in the next section, I show the posterior distri-
bution of the volatility inmacroeconomic series that results from the shocks. I measure volatility
by the variance in the series that would prevail if technology news shocks were the only struc-
tural disturbances in the economy, i.e., the sum of squared impulse responses. Figure 18 shows
the posterior median variance together with a 68 percent confidence interval for output growth,
inflation, nominal and real interest rates, as well as the growth in hours worked and real wages
for the time period from 1962:4 to 2010:3.
The following findings are worth noting. First, the contribution of technology news shocks
to the variance of output growth, inflation, hours worked and real wage growth is relatively
stable across time periods, showing no tendency to decline as suggested by the Great Moderation
hypothesis. Moreover, the confidence intervals also exhibit no systematic change over time, be-
ing roughly of the same width on average. Thus, there is no posterior evidence that technology
news shocks have contributed significantly to the Great Moderation, i.e., the remarkable decline
in the volatility of real activity and inflation since the mid 1980s. Second, the volatility in the
nominal interest rate due to technology news shocks is also rather stable over time, except for
the late 1960s and in particular the early 1980s when Paul Volcker became chairman of the Fed.
For the real interest rate, volatility spikes are concentrated on the 1970s and early 1980s, while
the periods before and after show little time variation.
5 Explaining the evidence
Comparing impulse responses and volatilities across time periods is potentially problematic
since it is not possible to exactly disentangle to what extent the observed time variation is due
to changes in the size of the shocks or the transmissionmechanism, i.e., the underlying structure
of the economy. For each variable, the initial response is always a combination of both. Hence, if
we observe that the response of the nominal interest rate is larger in a given period than before,
it is not a priori clear whether this is due to the fact that the size of the technology news shocks
has increased or the structure of the economy changed. In order to overcome this problem, part
of the related literature proposes to normalize on the initial response of a particular variable
and interprets the resulting impulse responses as being generated by shocks of equal size.22
22See for instance Canova, Gambetti, and Pappa (2007) or Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2008) who
normalize on output growth (demand shocks), inflation (supply shocks) and the nominal interest rate
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Given that any normalization scheme is to some extent arbitrary, however, I do not follow this
avenue but nevertheless provide a possible - and plausible - interpretation of the observed time
variation in the nominal interest rate.
Recall that neither output growth nor inflation show significant variation in the response
to technology news shocks over time, while the nominal interest rate does. Thus, if the time
variation in the nominal interest rate would have been the result of shocks of different size,
the structure of the economy must have always changed in such a way that the impact on
output growth and inflation does not change. Such a behavior of the economy seems, however,
unlikely. What appears more plausible though is that the constant response of output growth
and inflation to technology news shocks reflects the fact that the shocks are similar in size across
periods and the time variation in the nominal interest rate is instead due to systematic changes
in the endogenous component of the monetary policy rule.
To support this hypothesis, consider Figure 19, which shows the impulse responses for out-
put growth, inflation, and the nominal interest rate at four selected dates: 1967:4, 1976:4, 1992:4,
and 2008:4. These dates are chosen to represent in turn the period prior to the build up in infla-
tion, the Great Inflation period, the Great Moderation period, and finally the recent Great Recession
period.23 The graphs report the posterior mean together with a 68 percent confidence interval.
Across these Great Events, the impulse responses for output growth and inflation exhibit a sim-
ilar pattern. For the nominal interest rate, the impulse responses are also similar across time,
except for the Great Inflation period. Around 1976:4, the response significantly switches its sign
from negative to positive, which can hardly be the result of a change in the magnitude of the
technology news shocks, given the constant output growth and inflation responses. The theo-
retical business cycle model suggests, however, that the monetary policy reaction to technology
news shocks crucially depends on the coefficients in the interest rate rule, i.e., the elasticity of
the nominal interest rate with respect to inflation (φpi) and the output gap (φy), respectively. The
sign switch during the Great Inflation period may thus be explained by a decline in φpi relative
to φy, probably reflecting a change in the central bank’s preferences towards a larger weight on
output gap stabilization relative to stabilizing the rate of inflation.
In order to illustrate this point, I simulate the business cycle model for two different mon-
etary policy regimes. First, I include an interest rate rule with an exceptionally weak response
to inflation (φpi = 1.01) and a strong response to the output gap (φy = 0.9), mimicking the per-
(monetary policy shocks), respectively. Canova and Gambetti (2009) also normalize on the nominal inter-
est rate in the context of monetary policy shocks.
23Choosing different quarters in the proximity of the selected dates gives a similar picture.
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ceived monetary policy reaction during the Great Inflation era. Second, I consider a less accom-
modative rule with a weak response to the output gap (φy = 0.1) but a strong one to inflation
(φpi = 2). The latter rule should capture monetary policy behavior before and after the high
inflation period of the mid and late 1970s. All remaining structural parameters are set to their
values in the baseline calibration.
The theoretical impulse responses for output, inflation, and the nominal interest rate under
both regimes are shown in Figure 20. Under the accommodative monetary policy regime, the
nominal interest rate increases in response to the expansionary technology news shock despite
the decline in inflation (see left panel). Shiftingmonetary policy towards amore aggressive reac-
tion to inflation and a less accommodative one to the output gap induces an immediate decline
in the nominal interest rate (see right panel). Hence, a systematic change in the relative size of
φpi and φy before and after the Great Inflation period is a possible - and plausible - explanation
for the observed time variation in the nominal interest rate.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the time varying impact of technology news shocks on the U.S. economy
during the Post-World War II era using a structural time varying parameter VAR model. The
TVP-VAR is developed inter alia in Cogley and Sargent (2001) as well as Primiceri (2005) and al-
lows for both time varying coefficients and stochastic volatility. Recent applications to the trans-
mission of technology surprise shocks to the U.S. economy include Galí and Gambetti (2009) as
well as Hofmann et al. (2010). In order to analyze the time varying effects of U.S. monetary pol-
icy, the model is used in Canova and Gambetti (2009) and Baumeister and Benati (2010), while
Pereira and Lopes (2010) and Kirchner, Cimadomo, and Hauptmeier (2010) provide an applica-
tion to U.S. and euro area fiscal policy, respectively. Moreover, Baumeister and Peersman (2008)
investigate the time varying impact of oil supply shocks on the U.S. economy within the same
framework. An application to technology news shocks is, however, not yet available.
In identification I work with model-based restrictions for two reasons. First, the contempo-
raneous zero restrictions frequently used are often absent in theoretical business cycle models
and thus hard to defend. Second, the model-based approach allows me to link the reduced form
evidence coming from the TVP-VAR to the business cycle model and hence to provide a pos-
sible - and plausible - structural explanation for the observed time variation. The identification
restrictions are derived from a standard new Keynesian DSGEmodel and hold for a wide range
of parameter constellations. Moreover, the set of restrictions is sufficient to discriminate tech-
nology news shocks from other supply and demand side disturbances.
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Overall, there is little evidence that the variance of technology news shocks or their trans-
mission to real activity and inflation has changed over time. In particular, the findings do not
support the hypothesis that such shocks have contributed significantly to the Great Moderation.
However, I detect significant time variation in the endogenous monetary policy reaction to tech-
nology news shocks; responding strongly to inflation most of the time, but less during the Great
Inflation period. Using the theoretical business cycle model, I argue that the observed time vari-
ation in the nominal interest rate may be explained by a systematic change in the relative size
of the coefficients in the monetary policy rule before and after the Great Inflation period.
The evidence of this paper thus supports the hypothesis that the high inflation rates of the
mid and late 1970s were the result of bad policy rather than bad luck as suggested for instance
by Clarida et al. (2000), Cogley and Sargent (2001), or Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). However,
I cannot rule out that besides this systematic change towards a less aggressive monetary pol-
icy stance on inflation during the 1970s, other factors, such as larger exogenous monetary pol-
icy or technology surprise shocks, have also contributed to the build up in inflation (see, e.g.,
Sims and Zha, 2006; Canova and Gambetti, 2009, among others). The findings of this paper are
hence not necessarily inconsistent with the bad luck story.
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A The linearized business cycle model
The following equations summarize the log-linearized equilibrium of the model. All variables
are expressed in percentage deviation from steady state.
cˆt = Etcˆt+1 −
1
σ
(rˆt − Etpˆit+1) +
1
σ
(
eˆbt − Eteˆ
b
t+1
)
(A.1)
pˆit = βEtpˆit+1 +
(1− θ) (1− βθ)
θ
1− α
1− α+ α
mˆct (A.2)
mˆct = (wˆt − pˆt)− aˆt + αnˆt (A.3)
(wˆt − pˆt) = (1− γ) (eˆ
n
t + ϕnˆt + σcˆt) (A.4)
yˆt = aˆt + (1− α) nˆt (A.5)
yˆt = cˆt (A.6)
rˆt = φpipit + φy
(
yˆt − yˆ
f
t
)
+ eˆrt (A.7)
yˆft =
1 + (1− γ)ϕ
(1− α) (1− γ)σ + (1− γ)ϕ+ α
aˆt −
(1− α) (1− γ)
(1− α) (1− γ)σ + (1− γ)ϕ+ α
eˆnt (A.8)
The equations are in that order: the consumption Euler equation, the inflation equation or new
Keynesian Phillips curve with inflation driven by marginal costs, marginal costs, the labor sup-
ply curve with real wage rigidities, the production function, the goods market clearing condi-
tion, the interest rate rule, and the equation characterizing flexible price output.
B The data
The quarterly U.S. data are from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database and
cover the period 1947:1 to 2010:3.
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDPC1), billions of chained 2005 dollars, sa
Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator (GDPDEF), index 2005 = 100, sa
3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate (TB3MS), Percent
Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons (HOANBS), index 2005 = 100, sa
Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation per Hour (COMPRNBF), index 2005 = 100, sa
sa: seasonally adjusted; FRED mnemonics in parantheses
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C The Gibbs sampling algorithm
This appendix sketches the Gibbs sampling algorithm used to estimate the TVP-VAR. See
Primiceri (2005), Carter and Kohn (1994), Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (1995), as well as
Kim, Shepard, and Chib (1998) for further details.
Step 1: Initialize AT , ΣT , sT , Q, S, andW .
Step 2: Sample BT from p
(
BT |Y T , AT ,ΣT , Q, S,W
)
.
Conditional on all other parameters and the data, the observation equation
yt = X
′
tBt + ut = X
′
tBt + A
−1
t Σtet, with et ∼ N (0, I), is linear and has Gaussian
innovations. Draws for Bt = Bt−1 + νt are obtained from N
(
Bt|t+1, Pt|t+1
)
, where
Bt|t+1 = E
(
Bt|Bt+1, Y
T , AT ,ΣT , Q, S,W
)
and Pt|t+1 = Var
(
Bt|Bt+1, Y
T , AT ,ΣT , Q, S,W
)
,
using the algorithm of Carter and Kohn (1994).
Step 3: Sample AT from p
(
AT |Y T , BT ,ΣT , Q, S,W
)
.
The system of equations yt = X
′
tBt+A
−1
t Σtet can be written asAt (yt −X
′
tBt) = Atyˆt = Σtet,
where, conditional on BT , yˆt is observable. Since At is lower triangular with ones on the main
diagonal, the system of equations is given by
yˆ1,t = σ1,te1,t, (C.1)
yˆi,t = −yˆ[1,i−1],tαi,t + σi,tei,t, i = 2, ..., 5 , (C.2)
where ei,t is the i-th element of et and yˆ[1,i−1],t denotes the row vector [yˆ1,t, yˆ2,t, ..., yˆi,t].
Given that S is block-diagonal, the algorithm of Carter and Kohn (1994) can be applied
equation by equation to obtain draws for αi,t from N
(
αi,t|t+1,Λi,t|t+1
)
, where αi,t|t+1 =
E
(
αi,t|αi,t+1, Y
T , BT ,ΣT , Q, S,W
)
and Λi,t|t+1 = Var
(
αi,t|αi,t+1, Y
T , BT ,ΣT , Q, S,W
)
.
Step 4: Sample ΣT from p
(
ΣT |Y T , AT , BT , Q, S,W, sT
)
.
Consider the system of non-linear measurement equations At (yt −X
′
tBt) = y
∗
t = Σtet,
where, conditional on BT and AT , y∗t is observable. Squaring and taking logarithms of each
element converts the system into a linear one:
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y∗∗t = 2 ht + gt, (C.3)
ht = ht−1 + ηt, (C.4)
where y∗∗i,t = ln
[(
y∗i,t
)2
+ 0.001
]
; the constant (0.001) makes the estimation procedure more
robust; hi,t = ln σi,t; and gi,t = ln
(
e2i,t
)
. Though linear, the system is non-Gaussian since the
innovations in the measurement equations are distributed as lnχ2 (1). I follow Kim et al. (1998)
and use amixture of seven normal densities with component probabilities qj , meansmj−1.2704,
and variances v2j to transform the system into a Gaussian one. The parameters
(
qj ,mj , v
2
j
)
are
chosen to match the moments of the ln χ2 (1) distribution:
Table 3: Mixing distributions as in Kim et al. (1998)
j qj mj v
2
j
1 0.00730 -10.12999 5.79596
2 0.10556 -3.97281 2.61369
3 0.00002 -8.56686 5.17950
4 0.04395 2.77786 0.16735
5 0.34001 0.61942 0.64009
6 0.24566 1.79518 0.34023
7 0.25750 -1.08819 1.26261
Let sT = [s1, ..., sT ]
′ be the matrix of indicator variables selecting the member of the
mixture, j = 1, ..., 7, used for each element of e. Conditional on BT , AT , Q, S, W , and sT ,
the system is approximately Gaussian and the algorithm of Carter and Kohn (1994) can be
used to draw ht from N
(
ht|t+1, Ht|t+1
)
, where ht|t+1 = E
(
ht|ht+1, Y
T , AT , BT , Q, S,W, sT
)
and
Ht|t+1 = Var
(
ht|ht+1, Y
T , AT , BT , Q, S,W, sT
)
.
Step 5: Sample Q,S,W from p
(
Q|Y T , AT , BT ,ΣT
)
, p
(
S|Y T , AT , BT ,ΣT
)
, and
p
(
W |Y T , AT , BT ,ΣT
)
, respectively.
Conditional on Y T , AT , BT , and ΣT , the hyperparameters Q,S,W have inverse-Wishard
posterior distributions from which draws can be directly obtained, see Gelman et al. (1995).
Step 6: Go to step 2.
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D Rotation matrices
In the context of a five variable VAR a 5× 5 Givens matrix has, for example, the following form
H3,4 (θ8) =


1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 cos (θ8) − sin (θ8) 0
0 0 sin (θ8) cos (θ8) 0
0 0 0 0 1


,
i.e., the matrix is the 5×5 identity matrix in which the (3,4) and (4,3) elements are replaced by the
sine terms and the angle θ8 lies within [0, pi]. Accordingly, I replace the (3,3) and (4,4) elements
by the cosine terms. To construct an orthonormal matrix H , I use the multiple of the basic set
of Givens matrices: H = H1,2 (θ1) × H1,3 (θ2) × H1,4 (θ3) × H1,5 (θ4) × H2,3 (θ5) × H2,4 (θ6) ×
H2,5 (θ7) ×H3,4 (θ8) ×H3,5 (θ9) ×H4,5 (θ10). The angles θi are randomly drawn from a uniform
distribution on [0, pi].
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Figure 1: Theoretical impulse responses to a technology surprise shock: Baseline cali-
bration. Note: x-axis: quarters; y-axis: percentage deviation from steady state.
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Figure 2: Theoretical impulse responses to a technology news shock: Baseline calibra-
tion. Note: x-axis: quarters; y-axis: percentage deviation from steady state.
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Figure 3: Theoretical impulse responses to a monetary policy shock: Baseline calibra-
tion. Note: x-axis: quarters; y-axis: percentage deviation from steady state.
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Figure 4: Theoretical impulse responses to a preference shock: Baseline calibration. Note:
x-axis: quarters; y-axis: percentage deviation from steady state.
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Figure 5: Theoretical impulse responses to a labor supply shock: Baseline calibration.
Note: x-axis: quarters; y-axis: percentage deviation from steady state.
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Figure 6: Theoretical impulse responses to technology surprise shocks: Simulation ex-
ercise. Note: Based on 10,000 draws. Gray shaded area is the pointwise difference between the 84th and
16th percentiles of the posterior distribution. x-axis: quarters; y-axis: percentage deviation from steady
state.
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Figure 7: Theoretical impulse responses to technology news shocks: Simulation exer-
cise. Note: Based on 10,000 draws. Gray shaded area is the pointwise difference between the 84th and
16th percentiles of the posterior distribution. x-axis: quarters; y-axis: percentage deviation from steady
state.
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Figure 8: Theoretical impulse responses to monetary policy shocks: Simulation exercise.
Note: Based on 10,000 draws. Gray shaded area is the pointwise difference between the 84th and 16th
percentiles of the posterior distribution. x-axis: quarters; y-axis: percentage deviation from steady state.
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Figure 9: Theoretical impulse responses to preference shocks: Simulation exercise. Note:
Based on 10,000 draws. Gray shaded area is the pointwise difference between the 84th and 16th percentiles
of the posterior distribution. x-axis: quarters; y-axis: percentage deviation from steady state.
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Figure 10: Theoretical impulse responses to labor supply shocks: Simulation exercise.
Note: Based on 10,000 draws. Gray shaded area is the pointwise difference between the 84th and 16th
percentiles of the posterior distribution. x-axis: quarters; y-axis: percentage deviation from steady state.
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Figure 11: Time varying impulse responses to technology news shocks: Output growth.
Note: Shows the posterior mean. x-axis (reversed): quarters; y-axis: time; z-axis: percent.
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Figure 12: Time varying impulse responses to technology news shocks: Inflation. Note:
Shows the posterior mean. x-axis: quarters; y-axis: time; z-axis: percentage points.
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Figure 13: Time varying impulse responses to technology news shocks: Nominal inter-
est rate. Note: Shows the posterior mean. x-axis: quarters; y-axis: time; z-axis: percentage points.
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Figure 14: Time varying impulse responses to technology news shocks: Real interest
rate. Note: Shows the posterior mean. x-axis (reversed): quarters; y-axis: time; z-axis: percentage
points.
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Figure 15: Time varying impulse responses to technology news shocks: Growth in hours
worked. Note: Shows the posterior mean. x-axis (reversed): quarters; y-axis: time; z-axis: percent.
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Figure 16: Time varying impulse responses to technology news shocks: Growth in real
wages. Note: Shows the posterior mean. x-axis (reversed): quarters; y-axis: time; z-axis: percent.
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Figure 17: Time varying impulse responses to technology news shocks on impact. Note:
Shows the posterior mean (solid) with 68 percent confidence interval (dashed). x-axis: time; y-axis: per-
cent/percentage points.
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Figure 18: Volatility due to technology news shocks. Note: Shows the posterior median (solid)
with 68 percent confidence interval (dashed). x-axis: time; y-axis: posterior variance.
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Figure 19: Impulse responses to technology news shocks at selected dates. Note: Shows
the posterior mean (solid) with 68 percent confidence interval (dashed). x-axis: quarters; y-axis: per-
cent/percentage points.
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Figure 20: Theoretical impulse responses to technology news shocks for different mon-
etary policy regimes. Note: Interest rate rule with weak response to inflation (φpi = 1.01) and strong
response to output gap (φy = 0.9) (left panel). Interest rate rule with strong response to inflation (φpi = 2)
and weak response to output gap (φy = 0.1) (right panel). x-axis: quarters; y-axis: percentage deviation
from steady state.
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